Financial Market Discipline in Early 20th Century Mexico by Elisabeth Huybens et al.
INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO
_____________________________________________________________















Av. Camino a Santa Teresa # 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
México, D.F. 10700










JEL Classification: G2, N2
Keywords: market discipline, selection bias
Abstract
We test for the presence of market discipline in the banking sector in early 20
th
century Mexico. Using a panel of financial data from note-issuing banks between 1905
and 1910, we examine whether bank fundamentals influenced the pattern of withdrawals.
When we do not control for exit, our estimation suggests that fundamentals were not a
significant determinant of depositor behavior. Instead, bank specific fixed effects and
systemic risk seem to have been the most important determinants of net changes in
deposits. However this period included the banking crisis of 1907, and the subsequent
exit of several banks, indicating that a sample selection bias may exist. Our results
change substantially when we use a two step estimator to take this bias into account. We
show that fundamentals were indeed an important determinant of bank withdrawals in
this period, clearly indicating the existence of market discipline.
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Recently, a great deal of attention has been paid to the issue of market discipline
in the banking sector. Market discipline refers to the discriminating behavior on the
part of private agents with respect to the risk taking behavior of individual banks. For
example, riskier banks may need to o®er higher interest rates to depositors in order
to attract funds. Creditors may penalize excessive bank risk taking by withdrawing
deposits.
Market discipline is an important ingredient in the design of optimal arrange-
ments for supervision and prudential regulation of the banking industry. Indeed, as
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1998) point out, enabling market discipline may have
several bene¯ts. First, it may mitigate the moral hazard and excessive risk taking
which is associated with the presence of deposit insurance and lender of last resort
services. Second, the presence of market discipline may contribute to increased bank
e±ciency by pressuring relatively ine±cient banks to become more e±cient or to exit
the industry. And third, enhancing market discipline may help to reduce the cost of
government supervision and regulation.
In this paper we test for the existence of market discipline for note-issuing banks in
early 20th century Mexico. We construct a panel data set with quarterly observations
for twenty eight banks between 1905 and 1910 and focus on how changes in bank
fundamentals { over time and across banks { a®ect bank deposits. We follow Martinez
Peria and Schmukler (1998) in controlling for the macro-economic environment in
which banks operate as well as for the behavior of deposits in the overall banking
system. We also control for certain bank-speci¯c e®ects. Moreover, in contrast to the
earlier literature, we speci¯cally take into account the selection bias introduced by
the fact that four banks in our sample stopped functioning as note issuing banks in
the period under study. Our data set is unique in that it contains data on banks after
they ceased to issue notes and were converted into mortgage houses. This allows us to
estimate the probability of exit and to condition on it while testing for the presence
1of market discipline.
Several papers have found evidence of market discipline in historical and contem-
porary economies. Gorton (1999) shows that for the U.S., the discount on private
bank notes between 1839 and 1858 was related to measures of riskiness of the issu-
ing banks. For more recent times, Baer and Brewer (1986), Hannan and Hanweck
(1988), Ellis and Flannery (1992), and Cook and Spellman (1994), ¯nd evidence that
the market for uninsured and even insured deposits exacts a price for risk taking on
behalf of banks. Goldberg and Hudgins (1996) show that the volume of uninsured
deposits also depends on the health of deposit institutions. Park (1995) and Park and
Peristiani (1998) demonstrate that an institution's risk taking behavior has an e®ect
on both the price of and the demand for its uninsured deposits. According to Flannery
and Sorescu (1996), the premium on subordinated notes and debentures is related to
balance sheet measures of risk of bank holding companies. For emerging markets in
Latin-America, both Schumacher (1996) and Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1998)
¯nd evidence of market discipline in the banking industry.
On the other hand, Billett, Garfunkel and Neal (1998) report that banks are able
to circumvent the costs of increased risk-taking by increasing insured deposits at
the expense of uninsured deposits. D'Amato, Grubisic and Powell (1997) show that
contagion between banks, not market discipline, was an important determinant of
depositor behavior in the 1994-95 banking crisis in Argentina.
Our results are as follows. We ¯nd considerable evidence of market discipline in
early 20th century Mexico: bank fundamentals in°uenced depositor behaviour in a
statistically signi¯cant manner. Controlling for the selection bias induced by exit is
crucial in obtaining this result. If we do not account for this, bank fundamentals
are not a signi¯cant determinant of depositor behaviour and the evidence for market
discipline is very weak. However, using a two step estimator to control for selection
bias reveals that bank fundamentals are indeed an important in°uence on deposits,
suggesting that market discipline did play a role in determining depositor behavior.
2Our results are important for three reasons. First, in the early 1900s, Mexico's
economy was very similar to that of several current emerging market economies. Af-
ter half a century of internal turmoil and armed con°icts with external powers, the
government of Por¯rio Diaz (1876-1911) brought a period of unprecedented political
stability to Mexico. The capital account was completely unrestricted. The develop-
ment of the domestic ¯nancial system - albeit modest - and a boom in international
investment translated into strong economic growth. At the same time, the economy
was left highly vulnerable to external shocks. All of these are features that charac-
terize today's emerging economies. Hence, our results and methodology may bear
relevance to the study of market discipline in contemporary developing economies.
Second, our results imply that, when testing for market discipline in the banking
sector, it is crucial to consider the selection bias introduced by exiting banks. Studies
that do not account for such sample bias may yield misleading results.
Finally, our results shed some doubt on a thesis regarding the e±ciency of the
Mexican banking system under Por¯rio Diaz put forward in Robitaille (1997). She
studies the Banco Central, a private payments system that ensured at par circulation
of the notes issued by Mexican state banks between 1899 and 1913 and contends that
\considerable government intervention weakened the disciplinary role of
Banco Central and thus made the system more prone to collapse."
However, the state banks covered by Banco Central constitute a large part of our
sample and were - as we show - subject to market discipline. Hence, even if govern-
ment intervention impaired the disciplinary role of the Banco Central, banks were
still exposed to other disciplinary forces - those exacted by depositors. Therefore
Robitaille's thesis may be an overstatement.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the historical
background, while Section 3 presents the empirical speci¯cation. Section 4 describes
the data and discusses the choice of explanatory variables. Section 5 then presents
the estimation results. Concluding remarks are o®ered in Section 6.
32 Historical Background1
Following independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico went through a 50 year period
of political instability, fueled by internal turmoil and wars with external powers.
In 1876 General Por¯rio Diaz seized power and was subsequently elected president,
a position he held until the revolution in 1910. The \Por¯riato" was a period of
political stability and economic growth. Internal tari®s were abolished, restrictions
on international trade and investment were lifted, and the transport infrastructure
was greatly expanded. The period was also characterized by development of the
¯nancial sector, albeit limited compared to other countries.
In the early 1900s, note-issuing banks were the predominant type of depository
institution in Mexico, with banks of issue accounting for 92 percent of assets of char-
tered banks in 1897 (Robitaille 1997). There existed two types of banks of issue,
\national" banks and \state" banks. The former were allowed to operate throughout
the country, whereas the latter could not branch out of speci¯c regions. There were
two national banks: the Banco Nacional de Mexico (BANAMEX) and the Banco de
Londres y Mexico, which together accounted for 80% of the assets of the banking
system in 1897. BANAMEX, which had been created to secure international fund-
ing for Por¯rio Diaz' government, enjoyed several special privileges. The minimum
denomination of its notes was ¯ve times smaller than that of other banks, it was
subject to a smaller specie reserve requirement than other banks, and only its notes
were accepted by the Treasury for tax payments. In addition BANAMEX, unlike
other banks, was allowed to use government bonds to back its notes.
Unlike the national banks, state banks were not allowed to branch outside speci¯c -
sometimes overlapping - regions, and were prohibited from operating in Mexico City.
By 1906 there were 29 chartered note issuing banks, including the national banks
(Robitaille 1997). Both types of banks issued notes which were backed by specie and
1This section relies heavily on Luce Jordan (1999), Maurer (1997), and Robitaille (1997), who
provide extensive accounts of the history of Mexico's ¯nancial sector.
4deposits. However, while the notes issued by the national banks circulated at par
throughout the country, that was initially not the case for state bank notes. Indeed,
the branching restrictions made it di±cult for state banks' notes to be accepted
widely.2
In 1898 a group of 13 state banks created the Banco Central, with the intention
of ensuring at par redemption of state bank notes in Mexico City. Banco Central
operated much like the Su®olk Bank System of New England. Its operations greatly
enhanced the acceptability of notes issued by state banks, and by the early 1900s,
these notes circulated at par throughout the country. In 1904 the Banco Central
established a limited mutual assistance scheme to provide additional protection to
holders of notes issued by state banks. Under this scheme, if any member bank faced
a bank run or had liquidity problems, it could utilize resources from a fund created
for this purpose by all contributing members. Each member contributed 2% of the
book value of its capital and had insurance cover up to 50% of the book value of its
capital. The Banco Central also acted as a ¯nancial institution for Mexico City in its
own right.
Until 1905, Mexico operated under a bimetallic standard, with a °exible exchange
rate between gold and silver specie, the latter being the predominant commodity
money circulating in the country. In 1905, the country joined the gold standard and
¯xed the exchange rate between silver and gold coins. However, between 1905 and
1907, the price of silver increased by about 17% and the real exchange rate between
silver and gold appreciated considerably. Hence the book value of banks' capital,
which consisted to a large extent of silver specie, rose drastically. This led banks to
expand the volume of oustanding notes and increase the money supply. In addition,
2This distinctive institutional structure of the banking system in Mexico resulted from the di-
vergent views of two ¯nance ministers during the Por¯riato, Manuel Dublan (1886-1891) and Jos¶ e
Limantour (1893-1910). The former favored a competitive banking system on the lines of the United
States and encouraged the development of regional banks to compete with the national banks. The
latter, however, was concerned about the stability of the banking system and perpetuated the special
status of national banks. For more details on the development of the Mexican ¯nancial system see
Maurer (1997) and Luce (1999).
5they also expanded their scale of operations by attracting additional capital in the
form of new shares { to a great extent held by foreigners.
In October 1907, a crisis hit the U.S. banking industry, brought on by a sharp
decline in the international price of copper. Banks which had invested in copper
futures su®ered heavy losses. This crisis also interrupted capital °ows to Mexico. As
a consequence, domestic interest rates rose drastically from 6 to 10 percent. The price
of government bonds in international markets declined from 34 to 31 pounds sterling.
The price of silver also dropped by 25% between 1908 and 1910. This reversed the
e®ects of the earlier appreciation and was a further cause of capital out°ow. In
addition, region speci¯c factors, such as a decline in the price of hemp and droughts
in some areas, exacerbated these problems for banks which operated in predominantly
agricultural areas.
Several banks faced problems in honoring their liabilities. The Banco de Oaxaca
was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1909, as was the Banco de Chiapas. The Banco
de Morelos and the Banco de Aguascalientes su®ered bank runs. The latter was
purchased by the Banco de Jalisco in December 1908. The Banco de Sonora took
heavy losses when several of its clients in the mining industry declared bankruptcy.
Two banks in the Yucatan were a®ected by the hemp crisis and were merged into
one in 1908. The Banco de Campeche and the Banco de Michoacan went bankrupt,
and subsequent government intervention converted them into mortgage banks. By
1909, seven of twenty-nine note-issuing banks had faced government intervention,
been bought by another bank or closed down. The government also bailed out the
Banco Central when it faced severe liquidity problems in 1908.
Given that there was repeated government intervention in the banking system,
and that the Banco Central operated an insurance scheme for its member banks,
one might expect that private agents had little incentive to impose discipline on the
Mexican banking industry in this period. In addition, loans by regional banks were
often highly concentrated by industry, as a consequence of the poor diversi¯cation of
6the regional economy. This left them more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. We
now turn to a formal test of the hypothesis of market discipline.
3 The Empirical Speci¯cation
We test for the presence of discipline in the market for short term deposits in the
last seven years of the \Por¯riato" by studying the evolution of deposits for twenty
seven note-issuing banks and the Banco Central.3 In particular, we test whether
deposits respond to changes in bank fundamentals measuring idiosyncratic risk. We
follow Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1998) in controlling for systemic risk in the
banking sector as well as for macroeconomic indicators. We also control for certain
bank-speci¯c e®ects, re°ecting the type of bank { national versus state { and certain
regional factors. The latter are important because of the branching restrictions on
state banks which imposed a severe constraint on state banks' ability to diversify
their portfolio.
Moreover, and in contrast to the earlier literature, we explicitly account for the
selection bias introduced by banks that exit the industry during the period under
study. These banks were restructured and continued operating as mortgage banks,
but were prohibited from issuing notes and taking deposits. Hence, we have data for
these banks after they stopped being deposit institutions and can therefore estimate
the probability of exit.







Here Wit represents the change in deposits of bank i between time t and t¡1. SY St
3Although there were 29 note issuing banks in this period, we drop Banco de Oaxaca and Banco
de Chiapas from our sample, for reasons that we shall present in the next section. In addition, the
two banks in the Yucatan which were merged in 1908 are treated as one throughout the sample.
7stands for the systemic risk in the banking system, while MACROt is a vector of
macro-economic variables. Both systemic risk and macroeconomic variables change
over time but are common for individual banks. BANKit¡1 is a vector of bank funda-
mentals. This vector is included with a lag, to account for the fact that information
on balance sheet is available to the public with some delay. Finally, DTY PEi is a
dummy variable indicating whether bank i is a national or a state bank or the Banco
Central, while DZONEi is a dummy for the geographical region in which bank i
operates.
The selection problem arises because we do not observe Wit for the entire sample
of banks. Indeed, we know changes in deposits at time t only for those banks that
did not exit at the end of time t ¡ 1. Hence the variable Wit is truncated and we
only observe it conditional on the fact that the bank was functioning in the period.








where WitjBiCOt denotes the change in deposits, conditional on the fact that bank
i continues to operate at time t: The error term in this equation is unlikely to be
mean zero and the estimates are likely to be biased. We use the Heckman (1979) two
step estimator to estimate this bias by determining Dit; the probability that bank i




0Xit + vit; (3)
where D¤
it is a latent variable, the value of which determines whether bank i continues
functioning. Xit is a matrix of variables that can be observed for all banks at all times,
independent of whether they are functioning as a deposit institution or a mortgage
house. D¤
it is not observable, but we de¯ne the observable dummy variable Dit as
8follows:
Dit = 1 if D
¤
it > 0
Dit = 0 if D
¤
it < 0:
Dit indicates whether bank i issues deposits at time t or not


























Given the speci¯cation of the selection equation and the assumptions on the dis-
tribution of the error terms, we can write the conditional expectation of the error
term in (2) as
E (uitjBiCO) = E (uitjDit = 1)



















where Á(:) and ©(:) denote the standard normal density and distribution respectively.
Substituting (5) into (2) we get
WitjBiCO = ®
0SY St + ¯
0MACROt + ±
0BANKit¡1 + µ

































and ´it is an error term orthogonal to the other variables.
Our estimation therefore proceeds in two steps. We ¯rst estimate the vector
°
¾v
by a probit on (3) and use it to construct a measure of the bias. Using this estimate
of the bias, we estimate the coe±cients of (6) for banks which functioned through the
sample period. This gives us consistent estimates of the parameters.
4 Data
As mentioned earlier, we use quarterly data on 27 of the 29 note issuing banks, and
the Banco Central, from 1905 to 1910. Banco de Chiapas and Banco de Oaxaca
were dropped from the sample because no information about them is available after
they went bankrupt in 1908, and hence they could not be included in the probit.
However, since these were very small banks4 their exclusion is unlikely to a®ect our
estimations signi¯cantly. In addition we only have data for the Banco de Guerrero
from its inception in the third quarter of 1906 to the ¯rst quarter of 1910.5 The
starting date of the sample was chosen to coincide with the adoption of the gold
standard.
4Banco de Chiapas accounted for 0.17% of the total assets of the banking system between 1905
and 1908. The corresponding ¯gure for Banco de Oaxaca was 0.68%.
5While we have data for the third quarter of 1910 as well, the data for the second quarter are
missing. Thus some variables which measure changes between the second and the third quarters
cannot be constructed. Hence the last usable observation is the ¯rst quarter of 1910.
104.1 Explanatory variables
We now turn to a description of the explanatory variables used in the estimation. The
dependent variable in the withdrawals equation is always the change in short term
bank deposits between time t and t¡ 1 as a ratio of the total assets of each bank.
4.1.1 Systemic Risk
Following Cerda (1992), we measure the level of public con¯dence in the system by the
amount of metallic money in the hands of the public. This was measured as the total
amount of metallic money in existence at time t less the amount of metallic money
held by the banks. A more conventional measure would include all components of M1,
such as bank notes (see, for example, Martinez Peria & Schmukler 1997). However,
in the Por¯riato bank notes represented idiosyncratic rather than systemic risk. A
higher level of metallic money in the hands of the public would indicate a lower degree
of con¯dence in the banking system.
4.1.2 Macro Variables
We use two variables to re°ect macroeconomic conditons in this period. The ¯rst is
the price of silver, which, as mentioned earlier, was the principal component of bank
reserves. While a high price of silver would raise the value of banks' reserves, it would
also induce the public to substitute it for other assets including bank deposits. The
second variable we use is the price of public bonds, which were traded on the London
stock market. This serves as an indicator of the interest rate in this period. The price
of silver was obtained from the Historical Statistics of the INEGI and the monthly
price of bonds is calculated as the average of the monthly highs and lows published
by the Boletin Financiero y Minero.
114.1.3 Type and Zone Dummies
We use a dummy for the national banks since, as mentioned earlier, they faced very
di®erent operating conditions from the state banks. In addition, we use a dummy for
the Banco Central which, apart from its regular banking operations, also functioned
as a clearing house for the notes of state banks.
Four zone dummies were used to capture the idea that the operations of state
banks were restricted to speci¯c regions. These regions were not very diversi¯ed
economically and the fortunes of particular banks were closely tied with the economy
of the region. The industry and commerce dummy was used for the six banks which
functioned in the states with a high level of commerce and manufacturing. These
were Aguascalientes, Guadalajara, Veracruz, Monterrey, Tamaulipas and the state of
Mexico. The mining dummy was used for states with mining operations, which were
typically heavy in foreign investment. These states included Chihuahua, Sonora,
Durango and Coahuila. The agricultural activity dummy was used for banks in
the Yucatan, Campeche, Morelos, Guerrero and Tabasco, and the underdevelopment
dummy for banks which operated in states with a very low level of industrialization
and/or old mines which did not yield much return. These states were Michoacan,
Le¶ on, Puebla, Quer¶ etaro, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Hidalgo and San Luis Potos¶ i.
4.1.4 Bank Fundamentals
We use the following variables to measure bank fundamentals.
(1) The ratio of the change in emission of bank notes of bank i between period
t and t ¡ 1 to the total change in emissions by all banks in this period. This ratio
measures the level of con¯dence in each bank relative to the total banking system. On
the other hand, the scheme of at par redemption guaranteed by the Banco Central,
subsidized relatively ine±cient banks. A disproportionately high level of emissions
by a particular bank in any period could also be an indicator of free riding.
(2) The short term assets to liabilities ratio for each bank. Short term assets
12include commercial paper, debt outstanding and investment in stocks and bonds.6
Short term liabilities consist of sight deposits, loans taken out by the bank and re-
serves.
(3) The ratio of loans to total assets for each bank, which indicates the composition
of assets and measures the banks' exposure to risk. Total assets include cash and
metallic reserves, commercial paper, total loans outstanding, real estate and property.
The loans include commercial paper, loans with collateral, mortgage loans and other
loans.
(4) The equity capital to net assets ratio which indicates the degree of capitaliza-
tion for each bank.
(5) The ratio of change in metallic money held by the bank to total assets. The
numerator represents the proportion of liquid, risk free assets to total assets. Total
assets are de¯ned as in (3).
(6) The ratio of liabilities to total loans. The liabilities consist of notes issued,
sight and term deposits, loans taken by the bank and reserves. This variable also
measures liquidity and riskiness of the bank.
(7) The extent of insurance coverage. This was the ratio of 50% of the book value
of capital to the sum of notes issued and short term deposits of banks. This variable is
de¯ned by the mutual insurance scheme run by the Banco Central, which guaranteed
50% of the book value of capital, and measures the insured portion of the banks'
deposits and issued notes.
Summary statistics of all the variables, before and after the crisis of 1907 are
presented in Table 1. As we can see, the deposits in the banking system grew slower
in the period after the crisis. The data also suggest that banks increased their own
liquidity after the crisis, as evidenced by the increase in the metallic reserves to assets
ratio as well as the liabililities to loans ratio. Bank note issue was signi¯cantly reduced
6While all loans were required to be of less than six month duration, this rule was regularly
°outed during the Por¯riato (Maurer 1997). Hence the loans referred to may not all be short term.
13Table 1: Summary Statistics of Banks and Macroeconomic Conditions
Before Crisis After Crisis
1905.1-1907.2 1907.3-1910.4
Change in Short Term Deposits/Assets 0.461 0.402
Bank Fundamentals
Assets/Liabilities 1.423 1.413
Change in Metallic Money/Assets -0.757% 0.172 %
Liabilities/Loans 0.955 1.030
Total Loans/Assets 0.861 0.843
Capital/Assets 0.239 0.290
Coverage 0.560 0.715
Change in Emission of BankNotes
Relative to Total Change -0.716 -2.403
Systemic Risk 0.492 0.486
Macroeconomic Variables
Price of Silver 28.625 26.562
Price of Public Bonds 35.606 34.987
Note: These ¯gures are moving averages over a period of 4 quarters.
14after the crisis. In addition, there was a decline in the loans to asset ratio, indicating
a decline in bank lending. There also seems to have been a reduction in the assets of
the banking system, as suggested by the increase in the capitalization ratio and the
decline in the assets liabilities ratio. The insurance coverage ratio increased in this
period.
The amount of metallic money in the hands of the public, which is our measure
of systemic risk, seems to have marginally declined in this period. This is somewhat
surprising. However, we ¯nd that there was a small drop in the period immediately
after the crisis and a subsequent increase due to a fall in the price of silver. The
average ¯gure re°ects both of these e®ects. As mentioned earlier, the price of silver
fell between 1908 and 1910, which is re°ected in the data. The price of public bonds
also fell, implying an increase in the interest rates.
5 The Results
We present our results in Table (2). The top panel describes the result of three
estimations, the ¯rst of which does not take the selection bias into account, i.e we
estimate equation (1). The second and the third column are results for equation (6)
after estimating a probit on equation (3). The columns di®er only in the variables
used in the probit7 which is used to estimate the selection bias. T ratios are presented
below the coe±cients. The second panel gives the F tests for joint signi¯cance of each
group of variables in each estimation. In each case, the dependent variable is the ratio
of the change in deposits between period t and t ¡ 1 as a proportion of total assets.
As we can see from the ¯rst column, apart from the loans to asset ratio, the vari-
ables which represent bank fundamentals are not signi¯cant. All of the coe±cients,
7The independent variables used in the ¯rst speci¯cation of the probit are the liabilities to loans
ratio, the ratio of the change in metallic reserves to total assets and the assets to capital ratio. All
coe±cients are positive and signi¯cant. The second speci¯cation uses the assets to liabilities ratio
and the change in metallic reserves to total assets.
15Table 2: Withdrawals Equation
Dependent variable Wit
Fundamentals:
Emission -0.0620 -0.0629 -0.0742
-1.2605 -1.2841 -1.4955
Loans/Assets -0.0455 -0.0496 -0.0454
-2.6225 -2.6877 -2.5413
Coverage 0.0046 0.0114 0.0050
1.6794 2.3303 1.8492
Dummies:
National 0.1129 0.1130 0.1435
4.5013 4.5193 4.3792
Banco Central 0.0920 0.0939 0.1215
3.8084 3.8561 3.8374
Mining 0.0877 0.0873 0.1172
3.8050 3.8093 3.8188
Industry 0.0852 0.0864 0.1154
3.7702 3.8022 3.7840
Agriculture 0.0733 0.0730 0.1060
3.7604 3.7415 3.7277
Underdevelopment 0.0849 0.0834 0.1146
3.7308 3.7079 3.7517
Systemic Risk -0.0983 -0.0982 -0.1015
-2.8861 -2.9284 -2.9263
Macroeconomic Variables
Price of Silver 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006
1.3210 1.5091 1.3605
Public Bonds -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005
-1.4456 -1.5837 -1.3991
Bias Term -0.0332 -0.3016
-2.5222 -1.9649
R2 0.0899 0.1020 0.0993
No. of obs 626 626 626
Tests of Joint Signi¯cance
Fundamentals 6.1929 8.4690 6.3924
2.60y
Zone & Type 6.6959 7.0334 7.0166
2.10y
Macro 1.3649 1.7892 1.4299
3.00y
Systemic Risk 13.8388 13.9788 14.8035
3.84y
Note: T Statistics below coe±cients. y represents the critical values.
16however, have the expected sign. The relative emission of new bank notes enters
negatively, suggesting that the issue of new bank notes re°ects a free rider problem,
rather than con¯dence in the bank. The loans to assets ratio is signi¯cant and neg-
ative since it represents low liquidity and high risk. The coe±cient on the insurance
coverage ratio is also positive, as we may expect, but not signi¯cant.
The macroeconomic variables are neither individually nor jointly signi¯cant. The
coe±cient on the price of public bonds (which is inversely related to the interest rate)
is negative, while that on the price of silver is positive.
The zone and type dummies are all signi¯cant. Among the regional dummies,
the agriculture and underdevelopment dummies are the smallest, suggesting that
operating in an agricultural area or an underdeveloped region was less advantageous
to a bank than operating in states with well developed industry, mining or commerce.
The dummies for the Banco Central as well as for national banks are large and
signi¯cant, suggesting that these banks enjoyed an advantage due to their special
position. The coe±cient on systemic risk has a negative sign, as expected, and is
strongly signi¯cant.
This estimation suggests that apart from the loans to assets ratio, bank fundamen-
tals were not important in determining the behaviour of bank deposits. Bank speci¯c
e®ects, as represented by the zone and type dummies, exerted a very strong in°uence,
as did the level of public con¯dence in the system. Macroeconomic variables such as
the price of silver and the price of public bonds were not signi¯cant.
We now turn to the results which include the selection bias. The second column
shows that including the bias term increases the signi¯cance of the results on funda-
mentals substantially. The e®ect of the insurance coverage ratio is much larger and
the coe±cient is now signi¯cant. The magnitude of the coe±cients of the loans to
assets ratio and the bank notes emission both increase slightly, although the latter
is still not signi¯cant. The coe±cient on the bias term is strongly signi¯cant. The
regional and bank speci¯c dummies are basically unchanged. The macroeconomic
17variables are still not signi¯cant, while the coe±cient on the systemic risk variable
continues to be negative and signi¯cant.
The third column shows the results with an alternative speci¯cation of the bias
term. The coe±cient on the bias term is again large and signi¯cant. The results for
the fundamental variables are improved, although not to the same extent as with the
previous speci¯cation of the bias term. The coe±cients on the dummies are slightly
larger although the agriculture and underdevelopment dummy continue to exert the
least in°uence. Systemic risk is still negatively related to the change in deposits and
the macro variables continue to be, both individually and jointly, not signi¯cant.
We see, therefore, that accounting for selection bias reveals that bank fundamen-
tals exert a strong in°uence on deposits. This implies that depositors were able to
penalize banks which indulged in excessive risk taking, as evidenced from the nega-
tive coe±cients on the loans to asset ratios and the emission of bank notes, and the
positive coe±cient on insurance coverage. All this suggests that depositor discipline
played an important role in the market for short term deposits. It is also worth
re-emphasizing that our data set is very unusual in that it allows us to account for
the selection bias induced by exit, in a way that other studies are unable to (see for
example, Schumacher 1996).
6 Conclusions
Our analysis reveals that despite considerable government intervention, market disci-
pline played an important role in determining bank withdrawals in Por¯rian Mexico.
The presence of a partial insurance scheme as well as the at par clearing house system
of the Banco Central, which e®ectively subsidized less e±cient banks, did not hinder
depositors from discriminating against and punishing such banks. We also do not ¯nd
any evidence of contagion between banks. In fact, the most important determinants
of deposit behavior seem to be bank fundamentals, a measure of systemic risk, the
18selection bias induced by exit as well as the type and zone dummies.
What could account for the presence of depositor discipline in Mexico in this
period? Maurer (forthcoming) shows that banks competed ¯ercely in loan markets
whenever possible. The state banks faced competition from the local branches of
national banks. In addition, the states of Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and Yucatan had
multiple state banks. There is no reason to believe that such competition did not exist
in the market for deposits as well. In addition, the presence of silver as legal tender
meant that there existed outside substitutes to bank deposits as stores of wealth.
There is also some evidence that the insurance scheme guaranteed by the Banco
Central was not very credible (Maurer forthcoming). The Banco Central was chron-
ically short of funds, so much so that it had to be bailed out by the government in
1908. Members were not required to deposit reserves in the Banco Central and it had
to o®er an 8% interest rate to attract deposits. In addition, it lacked legislative pow-
ers usually associated with a payments system. Unlike the Su®olk Banking System of
New England, it could not assume control over member operations in emergencies. It
also had no special access to members' books. All this conspired to weaken the role
of the Banco Central as a regulator of banks. As we show, this role was, at least in
part, taken up by the market.
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